Army Value Added Along the Way Ahead

Lieutenant General E.P. Smith, U.S. Army, Retired

Throughout military history, particularly American military history, a commitment to build and exploit technological advantages has remained constant. As in the past, today's military strategists remain fascinated with technology and the advantages it offers and continue to debate the precedence of technology over doctrine as the driver of military force evolution.

The prevailing Transformation azimuth of senior U.S. defense strategists appears to be an extension of leveraging technology to be more precise in targeting, more lethal in effects, and less physically present in potential conflict areas. Standoff engagement is in, closing with the enemy is out; quick strike is in, deliberate action is out; shielding defensive capabilities is in, forward presence of large U.S. military forces, particularly ground forces, is out. The supported force of choice manages air and space platforms piloted from afar. Forces on the ground and at sea increasingly support one another. Key ground forces in conflict areas are "eyes-on" special operating and laser-designating detachments. Land-component forces chosen for lethal strikes are often highly tailorable Marine expeditionary units.

U.S. military services are striving to be more expeditionary, to shed expensive "footprints" forward, strike from sanctuaries on an unlevel playing field, and project and retract more power more quickly and decisively. Opinions about the mix of service contributions before, during, and after potential conflicts are shifting. Roles and missions are changing among the services—some openly, others subtly. Competition among military services for Way-Ahead resources is increasing. Yet, successful efforts at real integration of service capabilities remain incomplete.

The Army appears to be the most affected by current Transformation efforts because it is most often cited as needing reshaping and downsizing. Decoded, this means using "liberated" funding to increase other service capabilities. The questions are, What kind of Army does this country need? What unique and indispensable capability does the Army add to joint-interagency formations? Is this capability the centerpiece of the U.S. Army's Transformation effort?

My purpose is not to debate the Way Ahead. What the Army envisions as a flexible air-ground team empowered by state-of-the-art technology and traditionally proven training regimens is basically on target. Rather, I see two issues that are critical to the future U.S. military component of national power:

- How the U.S. military exploits information to sustain or regain peace in the future.
- How, when, and where the U.S. military resorts to lethal means to resolve conflicts.

These issues affect current military service reshaping, especially the Way Ahead. Both issues are fundamental to shaping the military, and there is much discussion about both. There is not much resolution about either, however, that would provide service-capability architects the specifications they need to build a sustainable, fully integrated joint force. The key to addressing these issues most responsibly and progressively is to accurately define the need for the capabilities the Army is to provide in the future.

To leverage technological advantages, the military must know the desired outcomes it wants in relation to U.S. military participation in resolving conflicts around the world. The military should also know if one template for applying military power will fit the needs of all conflicts. The real challenge is to define and apply a new American way of war and build a military superior to all others, which would reduce risks. The U.S. military force should be so powerful and effective that potential adversaries would not want to face it. So, what mix of service capabilities is needed in this type evolution of U.S. military might? What is the Army's piece of the action to complete the puzzle?

Informational Component the Key

Defense industry capitalists recognize the dominant military means of the future as information technology (IT). The true reason for a conflict will be evident. Lethal exchanges will become a last resort, and a popular consensus to do so will be easier to marshal. Only those who cannot access situational understanding via IT means or those who maintain cultural blinders will remain ignorant. However, although conflict resolution might be settled using persuasive informational capabilities more often than lethal means, lethal means might still be necessary in some situations.

Information-to-intelligence gathering and processing technology will further empower elements of national power. All military services connected through IT resources will have more precise and surgical capabilities. The truth will come out because there will be fewer places to hide the true situation.

Sustaining or Regaining Peace

Deciding to use lethal means—and how, when, and where to do so—will not get easier. However, the need to use lethal means will be more understandable for those affected. The means will depend on the mission, enemy, force fit and availability, and time available. Yet determining which lethal means to use depends

on the desired outcome. Short-term outcomes might require assets from the air or sea, using information first, then using lethal means, if necessary. Most often the outcome intended will require ground assets, with outcomes and follow-on conditions culminating in the minds of adversaries. Before, during, and after such a conflict—one where long-term results are sought—soldiers will remain the military force of choice. They will remain the ultimate deterrent.

Lethal assets used in the air or on the sea will be remembered and feared and result in preventing some conflicts. Still, only ground-based assets can influence a behavioral change to maintain peace. Soldiers and Marines who come in contact with survivors of conflicts will best affect attitudes. Transformed to be lighter, quicker, and more survival and lethal across the full spectrum of conflicts, the military will become more responsible for winning and maintaining peace.

Some people might downplay the need for the military to earn the respect necessary for long-term behavioral change as the final critical phase of any military-interagency campaign plan, but those same people might not understand and appreciate the final arbiter of conflict—the enduring attitudes in the minds of the conflict survivors.

The future U.S. military is attempting to leverage all available technology, using optimal informational assets, linking with other service, interagency, and coalition partners, and deciding conflicts quicker and with less risk to all. That is clear, but the evolving U.S. military is not yet the best force for combatant commanders to use to resolve conflicts along an ever-widening spectrum. Joint integration is still lagging as are interagency and potential coalition lashup challenges.

Notions about services in traditional supported and supporting roles are shifting. Increasingly, all services will play both roles as needed. Ground forces, tailored with enabling IT, will continue to support delivery by lethal and nonlethal means from the air, space, and sea to help end conflicts or to set conditions for using follow-on force on the ground. Shaping actions by ground forces, especially those ahead of conflicts, will be key. Army defeat mechanisms—lethal and nonlethal—will continue to be overwhelming, and forces assigned restoration tasks will try to gain survivors' acceptance in postconflict areas. Army forces must help win the hearts and minds of people in areas where conflict has been avoided or resolved.

The Army's Real Value-Added

Combatants fearing lethal means will only favorably change their attitudes toward the United States if ground forces cause them to do so by setting a good example. Sharp, professional soldiers who treat other human beings fairly will cause decisive change and demonstrate a commitment to Army values. Army capital—technical and human—envisioned ahead must provide for this. Soldiers must be able to fight and win in environments intended to reduce U.S. technological means and advantages, from complex urban sprawls to dense jungles and mountainous sanctuaries, as well as soldiers adept at gaining and maintaining postconflict area stability to give long-term attitudes and systems a chance to change and endure.

The military needs force design parameters for the future, and Army Transformation will help other services evolve as well. If decisionmakers transform the Army so it can stabilize conflict areas (sustain or regain the peace) and marginalize all Army and other service conflict-terminating means, then most attempts to gain political objectives by military means will fall short of long-term objectives. The U.S. military's future is not about guaranteed roles and missions; it is about using the least lethal means to resolve long-term conflicts. The Army's role in that is key.

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Transforming for New Military Demands

Major Michael S. Hopkins, U.S. Army

A few years ago military buzzwords included "revolution in military affairs," "precision fires," and "massing effects." Today the buzzword is "Transformation." Former and current Chiefs of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki and General Peter J. Schoomaker understand the Army's need to evolve. Schoomaker recently stated, "I do not command anything. I provide forces to those Combatant Commanders [COCOMs] who do command the warfighters." Schoomaker understands that COCOMs and joint task force (JTF) commanders command troops in battle. Simultaneously, the Navy is basing its Transformation on three pillars: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing, while the Air Force continues to tweak its Global Strike concept.[1]

The way the United States flexes it muscle through the Military National Power needs to be transformed. The Department of Defense (DOD) must transform at its most critical and arguably, hardest juncture—the joint fight. Some senior DOD officials believe that the Joint Professional Military Professional Education system is "about right," arguing that service core competencies should be mastered at the junior officer level, while joint operations should begin at the intermediate level.

Praises for DOD's latest campaigns, including Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Global War on Terror, indicate how far the services have come in conducting the joint fight. I

believe, however, that the U.S. military must transform as one unit, not as individually separate services.

Goldwaters-Nichols Act

In 1986 Congress passed the Goldwaters-Nichols Act, a mandate for the military services to collaborate on developing a joint doctrine.[2] The service chiefs fought the mandate, but without it, the U.S. military would still be laboring under a stovepiped and service-oriented system. The *National Security Strategy* calls for the United States to continue as a joint venture. We must educate the services to think joint at the lowest levels. Service parochialism must not to be a roadblock to Transformation. The military should eliminate the distinction between commissions received from the service academies and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and streamline the services. For example, Army administrative personnel should be able to perform their duties in the same manner as any other service, and there should be only one standardized evaluation system for officers of all services. Doing this would ensure that officers who rise to the top have been evaluated equally.

DOD, as the executive agent of military power, must have three distinct organizations: land, sea, and air. Resource constraints, however, demand that the United States eliminate redundancy and inefficiency. To do this, the United States must indoctrinate military employees—uniformed and civilian—into a capability and effects-based joint force. These force providers must be joint-oriented, not service-oriented.

The two best joint fighters today are the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Marine Corps, which is not surprising, since neither is a distinct service. SOCOM is the organizational construct that the DOD should model to accomplish missions demanding flexible, responsive capability and effects-based units. DOD must flatten and streamline modular land, sea, and air units that rapidly deploy and then integrate them into a COCOM or JTF commander's warfighting effort. These units must be organized, trained, and led as joint entities to assure maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

DOD must adapt to change or risk extinction, so it must adapt to new warfighting techniques and the changing mindset of war. The United States is fighting a determined, resourceful, and dangerously adaptive enemy. If change does not occur, "doing business as usual" could affect the balance of power for the next millennium. ***MR***

NOTES

1. For more information about Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing, see <www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/proCNO10.htm#seastrike>, accessed 19 April 2004. For more information about Global Strike, see <www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/gstf.htm>, accessed 19 April 2004.
2. For more information about the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see <www.apc.maxwell.af.mil/text/excur/goldnich.htm>, accessed on 19 April 2004.

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MR Almanac

Technology and the American Civil War

Major Richard D. Moorehead, U.S. Army

German strategist General Helmuth von Moltke once described the American Civil War as "two armed mobs chasing each other around the country, from which nothing could be learned."[1] Despite Moltke's disdain for America's military efforts during the Civil War, the U.S. Army can learn a great deal about how advances in technology can change the nature of war. The conduct of war changed as a result of three technological advances during the Civil War: the rifled musket, the electric telegraph, and the railroad.

The Rifled Musket

During the mid-19th century, the use of the rifled musket dramatically changed how the war was conducted. Before the rifled musket came into use, Napoleonic tactics of linear frontal assault of massed forces, supported by direct-fire artillery and quick cavalry charges, was the recipe for battlefield success. European and American military leaders replicated Napoleon's tactics because he optimized the weapons he had at that time—smoothbore muskets with a nominal effective range of 100 yards and canister artillery with a maximum range of 400 yards. In contrast, the Civil War rifle had an effective range of over 500 yards when firing the conical Minie ball bullet.[2]

The rifled musket's increased range and lethality had several adverse effects on Napoleonic tactics. For example, an infantryman with a rifled musket was a greater threat to artillerymen and cavalrymen. Napoleon massed his artillery and used canister fire to decimate an advancing infantry line. The Civil War infantryman, using a rifled musket could target artillerymen before they were within range of canister fire, which forced the artillery to operate further from the enemy than was optimal.[3]

Using the rifled musket also allowed the infantryman to attack cavalry soldiers from a much greater distance, which reduced the cavalry's shock affect and made a cavalry charge more costly to the attacker. As a result, the long-range firepower of the rifle relegated the artillery and cavalry to lesser roles than they had during the Napoleonic wars.[4]

The change in infantry firepower shifted the tactical strength of armies from offense to defense by making frontal infantry assaults too costly,

which posed a serious problem for tacticians. Napoleonic-style warfare, as espoused by General Antoine Henri Jomini, emphasized a strong offense for a decisive victory. The problem soon became how to execute an offensive plan when the tactical defense was much stronger. Given the state of technology, the best answer was to avoid massed frontal assaults. One obvious method was to attack an enemy's flanks.[5]

During the battle of Gettysburg, Confederate forces attempted to attack the Union flank at the Little Round Top. They found, however, that attacking flanks using linear Napoleonic tactics resulted in disproportionately high casualties for the offense.

Toward the end of the war, units were changing their offensive tactics from massed lines to small groups. While some men provided cover, others advanced. Both sides used cover as available and sought to reinforce the skirmish line. Union forces successfully used open-order skirmish tactics to limit offensive losses during Union General William Tecumseh Sherman's Georgia Campaign and Union General Ulysses S. Grant's Petersburg Campaign in late 1864.[6]

To further confound the doctrine, soldiers were turning to field trenches and hastily constructed earthworks to protect themselves from increasingly deadly firepower. Both forces used earth and logs to fortify their defensive fighting positions while fighting the 1864 Overland Campaign.

During the Battle of the Wilderness at Brock Road on 6 May 1864 and Laurel Hill on 8 May 1864, both sides found that prepared defensive positions allowed them to repel attacks. The key to tactical victory then became attacking an opponent before he had time to establish a defense. In the end, the tactical advantage still lay with the defender because of the rifle's firepower.[7]

The Electric Telegraph

The electric telegraph significantly changed the military leader's ability to command and control fielded forces. Before the Civil War, the Army used couriers to transmit messages. Civil War commanders used telegrams to transmit messages instantly to each other over distances of a thousand or more miles.[8]

The government installed its first telegraph line between Washington, D.C., and Baltimore in May 1844. By 1860, a network of telegraph wires "crisscrossed the country east of the Mississippi [River]."[9]

The War Department, recognizing the telegraph's value, co-opted the existing civil telegraph structure for military use at the beginning of the Civil War, and established the U.S. Military Telegraph Corps (USMTC), in May 1861. Telegraph operators supplied the Union Army with technical expertise to transmit and receive messages; in return, the Union Army provided rations and helped operators construct, repair, and protect telegraph lines. In 1862, the Union Army constructed nearly 4,000 miles of telegraph lines that transmitted over one million military dispatches.[10]

More important than the volume of messages was the Union Army's use of the telegraph as a communication tool. Before the Civil War, information from distant battles took hours or days to reach headquarters. The telegraph permitted Civil War governments to "affect the conduct of campaigns through near-real time communications with commanders in the field."[11] President Abraham Lincoln sent 10 to 12 telegrams each day to his generals, routinely soliciting specific, tactical information. The telegraph allowed Lincoln to order his Union Armies' strategic repositioning, reinforcement, and pursuit tactics, allowing him to truly act as Commander-in-Chief of the Union Army and Navy.[12]

Union generals used the telegraph for rapid communications; including issuing orders; reporting dispositions of enemy and friendly forces; reporting progress and results of battles; and requesting reinforcements. In 1864 and 1865, Grant went a step further when he used the telegraph to coordinate the movement of all Union forces into one comprehensive plan. He received daily reports from his armies and issued orders to integrate their efforts. Lincoln and Grant used the telegraph to develop a strategic view of the entire theater east of the Mississippi River, allowing them faster, synchronized direction of fielded forces.[13]

The Railroad

The use of the nascent railroad system significantly changed how men and materiel were transported to the battlefield. Before 1830, armies relied on foot and animal transport, limiting to 10 days the amount of supplies they could carry, which decided how quickly and how far armies could maneuver. The rapid movement of men and materiel by rail increased the Army's logistical capacity tenfold. Troops and supplies arrived at their destinations quicker with less fatigue, and supplies arrived in better condition. The geographical scale of military operations also increased, allowing armies to become larger but still remain combat affective.[14]

Previous wagon-haul logistics and local foraging limited the size of armies to about 30,000 men. The advent of railroad resupply permitted armies to operate effectively hundreds of miles from their supply bases. During his 1864 Atlanta Campaign, Sherman's 473-mile railroad resupply line from Louisville, Kentucky, to Atlanta, Georgia, allowed him to wage an offensive campaign with an army of 100,000 men.[15]

Other affects of railroad use included prolonging the war by making decisive operations more difficult to achieve; improving logistics, which made it more difficult for armies to annihilate their opponents; providing escape for forces by rail or by receiving reinforcements before being completely destroyed. For example, during the First Battle of Bull Run, Confederate General Joseph Eggleston Johnston's army used the Manassas Gap Railroad to reinforce General P.G.T. Beauregard's forces, preventing their destruction at the hands of Union General Irvin McDowell.[16]

Recognizing the need to co-opt the civilian railroad for military use, in January 1862, Congress authorized Lincoln to seize control of the railroads for the war effort. The U.S. Military Rail Roads (USMRR), a subordinate agency to the War Department, was responsible for operating the rail lines. The USMRR and the USMTC provided leadership and

organizational skills that helped military leaders rapidly assimilate the new capabilities in the conduct of war.[17]

Military efforts in the Civil War demonstrate how new technologies can affect the conduct of war.[18] Modern military forces must be able to adapt quickly to evolving technologies and use new techniques in the pursuit of war to effect peace. ***MR***

NOTES

1. J.F.C. Fuller, *War and Western Civilization 1832-1932: A Study of War as a Political Instrument and the Expression of Mass Democracy* (Andover, England: Chapel River Press, 1932), 99.
2. Christopher P. McPadden, *Civil War Overview,* PowerPoint presentation C600 Lesson 10 AY 02-03 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College [CGSC], October 2002), slides 24-25; W. Glenn Robertson, "First Bull Run, 19 July 1861," *America's First Battles: 1776-1965*, Charles E. Heller and William A. Stoft, eds. (Lawrence,: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 86.
3. Robertson; K. Jack Bauer, "The Battles on the Rio Grande: Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, 8-9 May 1846," in *America's First Battles,* 77. During the Mexican-American War, the U.S. Army used artillery and cavalry in ways reminiscent of Napoleon. During the Civil War, the rifle's introduction to infantry, without a concurrent advance in technology in either cavalry or artillery armament or protection, changed the battlefield interrelationship among the three combat arms. The cavalry and artillery could be traditionally employed, but at greater risk and with less effect, or they could be pushed further from the front lines of battle, thus weakening their contribution to the fight.
4. Robertson.
5. Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of Warfare since the Eighteenth Century*, 2d ed. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 49; Thomas M. Huber, Introduction to lesson 8, *The Evolution of Modern Warfare*, Term I, Syllabus/Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, July 2002), 245; William G. Robertson and Curtis S. King, Introduction to lesson 9, *The Evolution of Modern Warfare,* 290. Huber notes that Dennis Hart Mahan taught Jomini's theories at West Point before the Civil War. Thus, many Civil War commanders learned Jomini's theories at an early age. Robertson and King state that the Army fought the Mexican-American War, using Napoleonic tactics with Napoleonic weapons. The point is that before and during the Civil War, military leaders knew and employed Napoleonic tactics.
6. Addington, 76; Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, *Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1982), 100.
7. Larry H. Addington, 49; Noah Andre Trudeau, "The Walls of 1864," in *The Evolution of Modern Warfare,* 373; Trudeau, 373-75; 373; Addington, 76.
8. Ibid., 48.
9. Arthur King Peters, *Seven Trails West* (New York: Abbeville Press, 1996), 176; 173-76.
10. David Homer Bates, *Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military Telegraph Corps during the Civil War* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939), 32, 26-27; 32; John Emmet O'Brien, *Telegraphing in Battle: Reminiscences of the Civil War* (Scranton, PA: The Raeder Press, 1910), 106.
11. Robertson and King, 290.
12. Bates, 123; 162; William R. Plum, *The Military Telegraph During the Civil War in the United States with an Exposition of Ancient and Modern Means of Communication, and the Federal and Confederate Cipher Systems* (Chicago: Jansen, McClurg, & Company, 1882), 22; Bates, 122.
13. O'Brien, 23-33; 141-43, 152-53; Bates, 119-23.
14. Christopher R. Gable, *Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War Strategy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, 1997), 1; 2-4; 3; 4.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 5, 8.
17. Ibid., 13.
18. Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Peter Paret and Gordon A. Craig, eds. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 299. During the Franco-Prussian wars in the late 19th century, France and Prussia discovered similar effects caused by the rifle, telegraph, and railroad.

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Training for War While Keeping the Peace

Lieutenant Colonel William G. Phelps, Jr., U.S. Army

As the U.S. Army enters the 21st century, its primary mission remains unchanged—to fight and win the Nation's wars. Under the rubric of peace operations (POs), the Army has participated in operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Based on open-ended operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Army can expect the duration of such operations to be longer rather than shorter. *The 1999 National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (*NSS*) and the 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (*QDR*) support this assertion.[1]

The Army faces a dilemma in preparing to fight and win the Nation's wars while also conducting peace operations around the world. Some might argue that the skill sets needed to fight and win wars and those associated with conducting peace operations are not mutually exclusive.[2]

The significant number of tasks mentioned are substantial enough for peace operations to be considered unique and should be treated as such. The degradation of warfighting skills resulting from executing open-ended peace operations places the Army's ability to fight and win the Nation's wars at risk.

The Army is at a crossroads in determining its 21st-century roles and missions and must strike an appropriate balance between the mandate to fight and the ramifications of conducting ever-increasing peace operations around the world. Failure to do so places the security of the United States at risk.

Key Operating Principles

An examination of the principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) provides a starting point for identifying several unique PO characteristics. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,* identifies six MOOTW principles: objective, unity of effort, restraint, security, perseverance, and legitimacy.[3] Among these, objective, restraint, and perseverance provide excellent examples of unique PO characteristics.

Objective. Every military operation is directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, attainable objective. Two points of immediate conflict for commanders executing peace operations are political objectives and the influence they have on military operations and tactics.

In war, there are usually one or two clearly defined goals (objectives). However, a clearly defined objective containing the purpose, scope, end state, and mandate (if operating as part or a United Nations (UN) force) conducting a peace operation might not always be clear.

Objectives change, and mandates are often adjusted to meet new needs. Poorly defined objectives often present commanders and units with significant operational challenges, the most dangerous being insufficient assets, such as equipment and personnel, to properly achieve objectives.

U.S. involvement in Somalia proceeded through three stages, and each stage was inherently different because of additional objectives. The stages included Operation Provide Relief, a humanitarian assistance (HA) mission; Operation Restore Hope, an operation that combined HA with limited military action; and UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II, a peace-enforcement mission involving active combat and nationbuilding.[4]

What began as an HA operation under the *Charter of the United Nations*, chapter VI, "Pacific

Settlement of Disputes," evolved into urban combat executed under chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace."[5] This migration from relatively benign HA missions to complex urban combat illustrates a phenomenon called mission creep.

While mission creep occurs during conventional military operations, the ramifications tend to be more significant during peace operations. The mission U.S. forces conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia, on 3 October 1993, illustrates this.

On 5 June 1993, supporters of clan warlord Mohammed Aideed killed 24 Pakistani soldiers during an ambush. Soon afterward, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution calling for the immediate apprehension of those responsible for killing the Pakistani soldiers.[6] This quickly led to U.S. forces being used in a highly personalized manhunt for Aideed. Overnight, soldiers were forced to adjust their mental mindset from a routine of providing humanitarian support and security to a search-and-destroy mindset. The military objective, driven by political considerations, changed, resulting in 18 Americans killed and 75 wounded. In response, President Bill Clinton ordered the phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia.

The price for maintaining a safe, secure environment in Somalia exceeded the political and human capital the United States was willing to expend. Underscoring the Somalia peace operation was clearly irresponsible. We could make a compelling argument that the metamorphosis of the operation's objective led to mission failure. The objective quickly shifted from relatively benign HA operations to volatile peace-enforcement. The force in place was not sufficient or appropriate for executing later missions, and the objectives as they evolved were not attainable.

Restraint. The need to apply appropriate military capability prudently is paramount. When training on warfighting tasks, soldiers learn they have no more than 3 seconds to return fire or respond to an act of aggression before they are likely to become casualties. In fact, battle drills are designed to prompt soldiers to respond to potentially life-threatening situations with little forethought. The mindset is simple—kill or be killed. During peace operations, however, soldiers trained to act with aggression and resolve in war are taught that, while they retain the inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent, tactical events such as the unwarranted use of force might take on strategic significance. Consequently, "peacekeeping requires an adjustment of attitude and approach by the individual (soldier) to a set of circumstances different from those normally present on the field of battle—an adjustment to suit the needs of peaceable intervention rather than of an enforcement action."[7]

The rules of engagement (ROE) in place during peace operations are usually more restrictive, detailed, politically sensitive, and subject to more frequent change than are wartime ROE. The excessive use of force could have adverse effects on mission success by undermining the legitimacy of the mission or the perception of impartiality. Soldiers taught to react instinctively to dangerous stimuli are forced to systematically process through a laundry list of conditions to determine if the use of force is warranted. Immediate response in war is replaced by graduated response during peace operations. Soldiers are therefore required to unlearn what would, in war, be a lifesaving mindset.

Perseverance. The peace operation should prepare soldiers for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. As in Bosnia and Kosovo, the causes of conflict between warring factions are often religious differences, intense nationalism, or territorial claims over ancestral homes. The deep-seated differences between antagonists transcend generations and are unlikely to be resolved overnight.

JP 3-07 states, "The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, *for as long as necessary* to achieve them, is often the requirement to success" [emphasis added].[8] So, when is "for as long as necessary" too long, and when does the "zeal to persevere" reach the point of diminishing returns? Unfortunately, there are no easy answers to these questions. Given the U.S. Department of State's admission that operations in Bosnia and Kosovo are open-ended, the current answer appears to be "as long as it takes." Perseverance often translates to prolonged, open-ended peace operations requiring heavy commitment of money and requiring forces that are needed elsewhere. Consequently, the zeal to persevere affects force readiness.

Arguably, the catalyst for U.S. failure to persevere in Somalia was the death of 18 American soldiers. The failure to persevere in Haiti might be attributed to a government and its institutions being so corrupted and the country's infrastructure so destroyed that both exceeded America's capacity to help. While Somalia and Haiti demonstrate U.S. failure to persevere, U.S. operations in Egypt (the Multinational Force and Observer [MFO] mission), air operations over Iraq, and ongoing NATO coalition operations in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate perseverance at the extreme.

Open-ended peace operations come at a cost. At a time when U.S. military force structure is shrinking, requirements to maintain and keep the peace around the world are on the rise. Sending Army units on repetitive peace operations increases force-operating tempo and dulls critical warfighting skills. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) assessments found that individual and collective combat proficiency can drastically deteriorate during peace operations.[9] Recent experiences in Haiti and Bosnia illustrate this problem.

The Cost of Keeping the Peace

To maintain a balanced approach on how peace operations affect readiness, it is necessary to note that not all units participating in peace operations suffer degradation in combat readiness. A number of variables determine the extent to which peace operations affect combat capabilities, including the type of unit participating, the skills used or not used, the length of participation, and in-theater training opportunities. In fact, some peace operations provide excellent experience that can help improve the ability of various types of military units to operate in combat scenarios.

Transportation, logistics, and to some extent, medical units conduct missions similar to those in a conven-

tional scenario. Special operations forces, particularly civil affairs and psychological operations units, also execute missions similar to those they would expect to do during combat operations.

Without question, peace operations offer opportunities to operate in an environment that presents new challenges daily. The units most affected in terms of combat readiness are combat arms and combat support organizations. Peace operations skills, while not entirely inconsistent with warfighting skills, have little overlap with warfighting skills.

Degradation of skills begins as soon as units begin PO training (on average about 6 months before deployment). Degradation continues through the duration of the operation, usually 6 to 12 months, and finally terminates, on average, about 6 months after returning home. Units participating in peace operations become unready for combat, and are not available for employment into another SSC or major theater of war (MTW).

Combat readiness also declines because operating conditions under which units perform PO tasks and the rules of engagement are different from those in combat. In Haiti during Operation Uphold Democracy, a peacekeeping operation (PKO), infantry and cavalry units conducted mounted (presence) patrols and dismounted (saturation) patrols day and night, performed cordon and search, carried out reconnaissance operations, and provided security.[10] These are typical combat tasks. In Port Au Prince, however, as a show of presence during cordon-and-search operations, units conducted night patrols under full illumination rather than in a stealthier manner. Before units entered a building, they gave occupants an opportunity to leave peacefully and then conducted searches with limited inconvenience to the populace, which reduced possible violence and collateral damage. Units also conducted reconnaissance patrols and security operations in full view of the local population as a show of force. Full visibility of U.S. forces provided a credible deterrence to would-be thugs.

The Delilah 1 antiradiation cruise missile photo on page 86 of the March-April 2004 *MR* came courtesy of ***israeli-weapons.com***.

The transformation that occurs in a unit's train-up to execute a peace operation should be addressed here. Representative tasks for a light infantry battalion might include—

- An execute readiness standing operating procedure.
- An assault plan.
- A defense plan.
- A plan to fight a meeting engagement.
- A plan of how to command and control the battalion.
- Procedures for performing combat service support operations.

Conspicuously absent from the list is "execute peace operations." Convention supports the belief that units well trained in warfighting tasks can rapidly transition to peacekeeping. However, CALL studies clearly show that "the farther the mission is from warfighting, the more preparation and training is needed. Detailed, mission-specific training is needed to prepare the soldiers for the peacekeeping environment."[11]

The immediate challenge a commander faces when alerted to execute a peace operation is determining what PO-related tasks units should be trained for and then developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with identified tasks. Army doctrinal manuals and joint publications provide little to make the challenge less daunting.

Field Manual 100-23 dedicates five pages to training and includes the comment that the unique aspects of peace operations should be addressed in predeployment training with the help of mobile training teams, training support packages, and if time permits, training at combat training centers."[12] Joint Publication 3-07 and JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, dedicate two and six pages respectively to educating and training soldiers for peace operations.[13] Recognizing this as a shortfall in its study, CALL states, "Currently there is no official menu of missions or tasks that a unit can use to train for a peace operation. Training plans are created based on anecdotal experience from other units and locally produced training support training products like the CMTC [Combat Maneuver Training Center] white paper. Commanders need a menu of missions from which to choose. They can then quickly build a training plan for their specific contingency operation. Once the missions are identified, they can be cross-walked to the supporting collective and individual tasks."[14]

Based on a study of units that participated in Operations Restore Hope and UNOSOM II in Somalia, the MFO in the Sinai, Operation Able Sentry in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, CALL developed a list of tasks unique to peace operations as well as tasks that would carry over from wartime tasks but that would have to be carried out under significantly different conditions.[15] The tasks CALL designates as unique to peace operations include the following:

- Use peace operation ROE.
- Separate belligerents.
- Apprehend or detain noncombatants.
- Enforce cease-fires.
- Escort VIPs.
- Conduct quick reaction force operations.
- Secure and operate checkpoint.
- Escort convoys (military and nonmilitary).
- Control and disperse crowds.

These tasks are not all-inclusive, and each contains numerous subtasks. The intent of identifying these tasks is to show that training for peace is not training for war. Units cannot do one while concentrating on the other. Retooling organizations trained to fight and win conventional operations to reach a level of proficiency conducive to operating in a PO environment takes time.

To someone who has not participated in a peace operation, training soldiers in these tasks might seem straight forward. The reality is that soldiers must unlearn warfighting tasks. Soldiers have learned to react to contact and must switch to exercising restraint when applying peacekeeping ROE. The word "negotiation" takes on new meaning. Soldiers rarely find themselves negotiating an obstacle; rather they must negotiate peaceful coexistence between belligerents.

Given the frequency with which the Army engages in peace operations and the likelihood of future combat operations being executed in an urban environment, it makes sense to add "execute peace operations" to unit mission essential task lists (METLs). If executing these tasks to standard is critical during peace operations, they warrant serious consideration for training as part of a unit's training model.

Getting units trained and ready to deploy to a peace operation has readiness implications well beyond the deploying units. Augmentation is required to fill the ranks of deploying units. For example, it takes a company-size element to fill a deploying platoon, a battalion to fill a deploying company, and a brigade to fill a deploying battalion.

Units providing replacements are unlikely to receive replacements for their new vacancies. Also, previously cohesive teams are often broken up to meet the deploying organization's operational needs. Leaders from one unit are pulled out and inserted to compensate for leaders failing for one reason or another to meet exacting deployment needs. Ad hoc organization (bad under the best of circumstances) prevails throughout deploying units and staff.

On a macro scale, the ramifications of PO deployments are even more significant. In a *Parameters* article, James H. Baker says that because units are often rotated to and from the mission area at 4- to 6-month intervals, the two units are "fenced" from combat contingencies at any given time—one to train for peace duties and prepare for deployment, the other for block leave, post-deployment personnel shuffles, and retraining for combat missions.[16] In general, the commitment of one battalion to peace operations on these terms is a subtraction of three battalions from the Army's combat-ready strength.

Once deployed on a peace operation, maintaining a well-honed, combat ready edge is even more challenging. Typically, forces deployed to peace operations use different skill sets to execute required missions. Furthermore, many soldiers deployed as fillers find themselves operating outside their respective military occupation specialties for the tenure of the deployment.

A post-Operation Uphold Democracy study by the Government Accounting Office found that "in the Haiti peace operation there was no need for artillery, air defense, or antitank fires. Military personnel from these specialties who deployed to Haiti and performed staff, security, and other miscellaneous functions found that their technical skills for operating artillery and providing air defense and TOW [tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided] missile fires were adversely affected. Even light infantry forces that did not have the opportunity to fully employ their skills faced combat skill degradation if they had no opportunity to practice."[17]

Infantry forces operating in Haiti did not have the opportunity to train on the majority of tasks associated with their warfighting missions, and few operations were conducted above the squad level. Live-fire exercises were impossible to conduct because of the absence of training facilities. Anyway peacekeeping forces were there to keep the peace, not to train for war. Toward the middle of the deployment, and after much negotiation, a small facility was leased to conduct small arms and nonlethal munitions training.

Peacekeeping forces in and around Port Au Prince conducted operations around the clock, with surge operations occurring when dictated by circumstances in the city. Most operations required limited combat skills, and the battle focus of all participants and staff was on maintaining a safe and secure environment, not on warfighting. Soldiers became adroit at conducting negotiations between neighbors who wished to kill one another and at practicing the art of restraint.

On many occasions soldiers fully justified by the ROE to use "just short of deadly" or "deadly" force showed great discipline and restraint by not doing so. But what proved to be acts of virtue on the streets of Port Au Prince would be manifested as deadly hesitations on live-fire ranges following redeployment. It took some time for soldiers to relearn quickly to return fire in hostile or threatening situations.

Without question, peace operations in Haiti affected participating units' combat readiness. More recent experiences in Bosnia evidenced similar degradation in readiness. Following service in Bosnia, the 1st Cavalry and 10th Mountain Divisions reported readiness levels of C-4 (not ready for combat) on their respective unit status reports. Following these announcements, senior military leaders and the press asked division commanders how two of the Army's premier first-to-fight divisions could be in such states. The commanding general (CG) of the 1st Cavalry Division said that after returning from deployment, his units needed time to retrain warfighting tasks. The 10th Mountain Division commander's statements echoed those of the 1st Cavalry Division CG.[18] He said his division could not disengage from Bosnia, redeploy to Fort Drum, and retrain and refit within the time constraints specified in the war plans his division was apportioned against.

One of the immediate challenges leaders face is to redevelop the warrior mentality in soldiers. Returning to a warrior mentality is not an easy transition to make. Part of rebuilding skills was a live-fire exercise. The scenario was simple. A buddy team and a fire team maneuvered down a lane where opposing force targets presented themselves. During some of the first live runs, many soldiers hesitated for 4 to 5 seconds before engaging the targets. When asked why, several soldiers said they hesitated because they were still cycling through the ROE graduated response levels they had been under in Haiti. The last graduated-response level under Haiti ROE was the use of deadly force, and they had to be sure the enemy was in fact a threat before they pulled the trigger.

After several live-fire runs, all soldiers managed to flush the Haiti ROE from their minds, which illustrates that units need time to return to a warfighting footing following redeployment from a peace operation. The CALL study supports this: "[A survey completed by noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers] shows a clear drop in combat readiness following participation in any peace operation. The most negative impact was on units assigned traditional peacekeeping duties. Perceived readiness in combat skills dropped significantly immediately

following the peace operation and did not return to predeployment levels until between four and six months after return."[19]

Personnel turbulence following a PO deployment further exacerbates the challenge of returning to a warfighting footing. On redeployment, many soldiers rotate to new assignments or leave the Army. Newly assigned soldiers must inprocess and assimilate into new organizations. Selected senior and newly promoted NCOs and soldiers aspiring to be NCOs must attend service schools. After completing schooling, returning personnel are often inserted into leadership positions, which requires more time for teambuilding.

The CALL study found that unit leadership turbulence was the personnel area that had the most dramatic effect on a unit's readiness. "The typical battalion will replace 80 percent of its staff within three to four months of return from an OOTW [operations other than war] mission. Not only are staff officers changed, but also the staff NCOICs [noncommissioned officers in charge] rotate, and the soldiers assigned special duty to the staff sections return to their companies. Typically, about three company commanders will change command in those same three months. Company-level leadership will also be impacted by the changeover of XOs [executive officers] and about half the platoon leaders and some first sergeants. Most of the squad leaders will be new, and almost all the individual soldier and team leader assignments will change because of PCS [permanent change of station] and promotion to E4 and E5 [corporal and sergeant]. The effect at platoon level seems most pronounced in combat arms units."[20]

Just as it took time and a concerted effort to prepare deploying units to execute a peace operation, it takes even more time and effort to refit, reorganize, and retrain units returning from a peace operation to carry out warfighting missions. And while this is occurring, the Army remains charged with fighting and winning the Nation's wars. These transition periods are when combat-readiness levels of first-to-fight units are suspect.

A Calculated Risk

As noted earlier, units participating in a peace operation are not readily available for commitment to SSCs or to an MTW. And, it takes approximately 6 months following redeployment to get a unit ready to execute wartime METL tasks. Yet the *NSS* keeps units deployed to peace operations in the mix of forces apportioned against the Nation's major war plans, contending that units must remain flexible and ready enough to transition quickly from a theater peace operation to an MTW.

The *QDR* acknowledges that withdrawing forces from SSC operations, and then reconstituting, retraining, and deploying them to an MTW within required time lines might "pose significant operational, diplomatic, and political challenges."[21] However, with no apparent alternatives, the *QDR* simply dismisses such challenges by insisting that "the ability to transition between peacetime operations and warfighting remains a fundamental requirement for virtually every unit in the U.S. military."[22]

As long as the Army continues to deploy first-to-fight MTW forces to SSCs, it incurs a significant, long-term readiness challenge. Analyst Mark E. Vinson says, "Currently, the Army plans on 6 months of retraining as a rule of thumb following a 6- to 12-month SSC deployment. Thus, by drawing its contingency forces from the MTW force pool, the Army has instituted an inefficient cycle of unit training, shifting from a focus on warfighting tasks to SSC tasks for a deployment, and back to warfighting tasks after redeployment."[23]

Clearly the Army has a conflict between its charter to fight and win the Nation's wars and its ever-increasing need to participate in peace operations. The challenges arise from a mismatch between mission needs and the forces available to execute those missions. The Army must now relook its roles and missions. If there are not enough forces to maintain warfighting readiness while executing the nonwarfighting missions, it might be prudent to reduce U.S. participation in such operations.

Perhaps the time to change the national strategy as it applies to fighting two MTWs near simultaneously has come. If the United States remains committed to a policy of global engagement, it must renovate the Army's force structure so its forces can carry out its expanding charter. What is clear is that the Army's current structure does not support the national strategy. ***MR***

NOTES

1. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], December 1999); U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997).
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3. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, DC: GPO, 16 June 1995), II-1.
4. Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 13-14.
5. United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, chapter VI, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," and chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," on-line at <www.un.org/about un/charter>, accessed 14 April 2004.
6. U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 837. See on-line at <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/332/32/IMG.N9333232.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 15 April 2004.
7. Allard, 20.
8. JP 3-07, II-5.
9. U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), "The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness," 13 August 1999. Available on-line at <http://call.army.mil/callspc_sdy/unitrdy/peaceops.htm>, accessed 13 February 2001.
10. I served as the operations officer (S3) of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in Haiti from June 1995 to June 1996. During that time, the brigade served as the nucleus of the joint task force headquarters (JTF HQ) and provided part of the forces needed to execute the peacekeeping operation. The brigade deployed its headquarters element (significantly augmented to bring it up to JTF HQ manning requirements), and two of its rifle companies relieved the 2d armored cavalry regiment (ACR) on 29 October 1995. JTF Bastogne remained in-country through 29 February 1996 and was the last combat element to leave Haiti.
11. CALL, 2.
12. FM 100-23, 38.
13. JP 3-07; JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 12 February 1999).
14. CALL, 3.
15. No publishing information given regarding the Combat Maneuver Training Center white paper. See also CALL, "Common Peace Operations Tasks," 19 August 1999, on-line at <http://call.army.mil/call/vignettes/haiti/peactask.htm>, accessed 19 February 2001, 1.
16. James H. Baker, "Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations," *Parameters* (Spring 1994). On-line at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1994/baker.htm>, accessed 19 February 2001, 6.
17. U.S. Government Accounting Office, "Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability," 1996, on-line at <www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad-96-014.htm>, accessed 4 March 2001.
18. No source for these statements given.
19. CALL, B-7.
20. CALL, A-2.
21. *QDR*, 12.
22. Ibid.
23. Mark E. Vinson, "Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness" *Parameters* (Summer 2000): 2-3, on-line at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/vinson.htm>, accessed 19 February 2001, 2-3.

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MR Review Essay

A History of the Kuwaiti Armed Forces

Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

Kuwaiti Brigadier General Ameen Muhammad Al-Saqr's book *Al-Qooah Al-Askariyah Al-Kuwaitiah: Ahad Al-Anaaser Qooah Al-Dawlah Al-Shamlah Lee Radeeah Al-Akhtar an Al-Dawlah* (Kuwait military power: one of the aspects of comprehensive national power in determining threats to the state) delves into the history and national security concerns of the Emirate of Kuwait. The book, which was probably printed by the Kuwaiti Armed Forces in 1997, details how Kuwait's strategic thinking has led to an allocation of resources toward their defense and illuminates how threats from Iraq, dating from near the end of the Ottoman period in 1902, helped shape Kuwait's defensive posture. The book, which is perhaps one of only a few Arabic books that details the military strategy and tactics of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) before and after Operation Desert Storm, reveals Kuwait's strategic priorities.

Kuwaiti Defense Before Independence

Al-Saqr discusses the evolution of Kuwait's armed forces from 1820 to the 1990 invasion of Iraq. Documents reveal that in 1820, Kuwait depended on tribal levies for its security and defense. Kuwait's main source of armaments from 1820 to 1912 came from gifts from government officials, tribal chiefs, war spoils, and purchases from regional markets in Africa, India, and the Persian Gulf area.

In 1912, Shiekh Mubarak Al-Sabah, the first emir to face a direct threat to Kuwait, negotiated with the British High Commissioner an agreement granting the tiny emirate 6,000 rifles with ammunition plus another one million rounds of ammunition for older rifles and muskets. The threat came from Iraqi King Ghazi bin Faisal, who assumed the throne from his father, King Faisal, I in 1932. It also had a rudimentary naval force of 35 merchant sailing ships and 150 smaller craft outfitted with different types of weapons.

Stages of Development

Kuwait's modern military, founded in late 1948, involved the separation of internal security forces from the armed forces, but the distinction did not become official until 1953 when the General of Security Services (GSS) gave up units to form the Kuwait Army. The Kuwait Army's chief mission was to secure the border, deter smuggling, secure sensitive installations, and guard the royal family.

In 1954, Kuwait's military consisted of a headquarters element and three infantry units, which were posted in Kuwait City and Mubarakiyah Fort, close to the border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. During the reorganization, the military's equipment consisted of rifles, light machineguns, heavy (mounted) machineguns, submachineguns, and pistols. Transportation elements consisted of trucks, jeeps, and armored personnel carriers. The reorganization was created to make the border security mission more efficient.

With the acquisition of Daimler military vehicles in 1955, the Kuwait military underwent another reorganization, creating the Sixth Mechanized Infantry Brigade, which was the first brigade-level formation headquartered at Mubarakiyah Fort. The formation stayed in place until 1967, when it transferred to Al-Jahraa. The brigade consisted of infantry, artillery (25-pound cannon), and tank formations, referred to in Arabic as "Kateebah" (battalion).

In the late 1950s, Al-Sabah focused on regular military training for recruits from different tribal affiliations and began delineating between specialties within the armed forces, particularly in infantry, artillery, anti-air weapons and missiles, communications, engineering, logistics, military band, military operations, and military health care. In 1953, Kuwait established an air force that until 1958 possessed helicopters, civilian passenger craft, and a single VIP aircraft.

After the discovery and development of Kuwait's oil reserves, the Waarah Infantry Battalion was formed under the command of Captain Muhammad Abdul-Aziz Al-Badr, whose mission was to protect oil installations and port facilities at Al-Ahmadiyah. In 1959, the unit was taken out of the Kuwait Army and merged with the GSS. On 19 June 1961, Kuwait declared its independence from Britain as a sovereign state, and on 17 January 1962, the Ministry of Defense was formed. Al-Sabah was named the first defense minister.

Soon after Kuwait's declaration of independence, Iraqi strongman Colonel Abdul-Karim Qasim, who had overthrown the Iraqi Hashimite monarchy in 1958, threatened to invade Kuwait. British intervention diffused the crisis in the region, which led to the reorganization of the Kuwaiti military in October 1961. Several directorates were created, including the following:

- A pay and personnel issues directorate.
- A military security and policing directorate.
- Recruiting and organizing units within the army.
- A military supplies and logistics directorate.
- A base organization, maintenance, and construction directorate.
- The Office of Military Experts, an early form of the inspector general office.
- The Office of Personal Aide-de-Camps to provide support to base commanders.

▯ The Office of Military Supplies, similar to the military supplies and logistics directorate but which acted independently to ensure the quality of supplies and completion of work performed for the Kuwait military.

In September 1961, the Kuwait Air Force was separated from the nation's civil aviation department and became its own entity. In July 1962, further efforts were made to transform the Kuwait irregular infantry into a regular force.

During the first year of Kuwait's independence, in addition to the Sixth Mechanized Infantry Brigade the following units were formed:

▯ The 35th Armored Brigade, created on 7 January 1962, was so named because it had 35 tanks in its inventory as well as 3 infantry battalions and 1 tank battalion.

▯ The 15th Brigade consisted of one infantry battalion, one mechanized battalion, and one unit of antiair artillerymen.

▯ The 25th Brigade was a training brigade for basic infantry tactics.

▯ Other units included a battalion of Emiri Guards, a music battalion, a transportation unit, a military health care unit, a communications battalion, a military operations unit, a missile battalion, an engineer unit, a mounted cavalry unit, and an artillery unit. These were task organized to augment the four brigades as needed.

On 16 January 1963, a mission statement for the Ministry of Defense stated, "The Ministry of Defense will have cognizance on all matters related to national defense and what pertains to the armed forces regarding the preparation of the army and its training, direction, arming to secure the nation and put forth plans and military studies for the arming and supply of the armed forces, taking all necessary steps within the limit of the law."

Coinciding with the issuance of the mission statement, a defense council, chaired by the army chief of staff, was created. Within the same month, the official title of the Military and Defense Council was changed to Military General Command and Staff Council. In November 1963, a higher defense council was created, chaired by Kuwait's prime minister, to provide strategic guidance to the armed forces.

In 1967, Law 32 was issued promulgating a military code similar to the *U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice*. Law 32 was divided into five sections: general rules, recruitment, rules during service, discharge procedures, and rules for military transfers. On 2 November 1962, the final action of the second phase established the Kuwait Military Academy, graduating its first class on 4 May 1970.

The expansion in military bases and the creation of a navy in 1973 led to Emiry Law 13 of 1976, which established compulsory military service for all Kuwaiti males as well as a reserve unit to maintain military skills and provide training. The law established a noncommissioned officer (NCO) academy that was open to select non-Kuwaiti citizens with military or specialized skills.

In 1977, positions for five assistants to the chief of staff were established: Military Operations, Administration and Logistics, Technical Affairs, Intelligence and Military Security, and Human Resources. From 1975 through 1982, the military debated the need for training in human resources.

The debate resulted in a focus on air power, air defense units being merged into the air force, and the expansion of the three air bases: Kuwait International, Ali Salem, and Ahmed Al-Jaber Air Base. The debate also led to the mechanization of the 15th Infantry Brigade. Arms purchases and the number of personnel serving in the armed forces increased, which in turn caused an increase in the number of specialized military personnel trained in communications, signals, engineering, and artillery.

Kuwait established specialized schools for fighter pilots, naval sciences, tanks, military technical subjects, and language training. Unlike nations whose language training is used to groom intelligence specialists, Kuwait's language school is used to translate the many technical manuals that accompany imported equipment. The Kuwait military also requires trained linguists who are able to communicate in joint environments with other allies.

In 1982, the computer age necessitated reorganizing into seven departments within the Kuwaiti General Staff: Military Operations and Supporting Arms, Human Resources, Logistics, Medical Services, Military Courts, Inspector General, and Intelligence and Military Security. In 1987 the Emiri Guards became a distinct brigade because of the Iran-Iraq war and internal threats. The Emiri Guard Brigade protected sensitive installations and absorbed the old Wafaa Battalion, which had been organized in the 1950s.

In 1987, influenced by interactions with other militaries, Kuwait codified its general staff as specified by Ministerial (Defense) Decree 96 of 1987, which stated that the Kuwait general staff would be composed of the following:

▯ An operations and plans department having direct control and communications with the heads of the artillery, engineering, and signals units.

▯ A human resources department responsible for training, recruitment, pay, and personnel matters.

▯ A logistics department.

▯ An intelligence and security department.

▯ A military legal and courts department, answerable only to the Defense Minister.

Kuwait forces were to be organized as follows:

▯ Ground forces were to be composed of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 35th Mechanized Tank Brigade, 15th Reserve Infantry Brigade, 80 smaller military police and security units.

▯ Air forces with bases at Kuwait International Airport, Ahmed Jaber, Ali Salem, and an anti-air defense brigade.

▯ Naval forces. (The book contains no reference to squadrons or bases.)

▯ Established units and departments.

▯ A border guard force.

▯ An Emiri guard brigade.

▯ An inspector general department.

This structure was in place when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990.

Historical Threats

Al-Saqr discusses historical military threats to Kuwait, the majority of which emanate from Iraq. However, he neglects to discuss attempted raids by puritanical and ruthless Wahabi groups known as the Ikhwan (brotherhood) who acted as Al-Saud's shock troops while creating the second Saudi state—Saudi Arabia. Al-Saud's desert campaigns lasted from 1902 to 1932.

In 1902, Ottoman forces were stationed in Umm Qasr, Safwan, and Bubiyan Island to secure access to the Persian Gulf and to subdue raiding tribesmen. Their base of operations was Basra, which technically administered Kuwait for the Ottoman Sultan in Constantinople. An Anglo-Ottoman Treaty, signed in 1913, recognized Safwan and the port of Umm Qasr as part of the Basra Sanjak (region), removing this area from the control of Al-Sabah.

Faisal I, Iraq's first monarch, did not encroach on Kuwait; his focus was on internal issues. The desire for Iraq to reintegrate Kuwait was mentioned only in passing speeches. King Faisal's son, Ghazi, who ascended the throne in 1933 and who was considered an unstable monarch, pursued a policy of integrating Kuwait into Iraq. Intervention by England, Iran, and Saudi Arabia diffused Ghazi's aggressive deployment of forces along Kuwait's border. The issue of Iraq's occupying Kuwait came up again in King Faisal II's reign during his attempt to counter Egyptian strongman Gamal Abdul-Nasser.

In 1958, the Hashemite Arab Union was announced in response to the union between Syria and Egypt. The Iraqi monarchy proposed recognizing the independence of Kuwait if Kuwait would join the new union. Al-Sabah refused, and threats of invasion ensued. The Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in a violent military coup led by Colonel Abdul-Karim Qasim, but Qasim did not focus on Kuwait until the emirate declared independence on 19 June 1961. Six days later, Qasim announced that he would invade Kuwait and force its integration into Iraq. The Kuwait government knew that it was no match for Iraqi forces and negotiated the arrival of a multi-Arab force. Hostilities between Kuwait and Iraq continued until Colonel Abdul-Salam Arif overthrew Qasim in February 1963. Arif recognized Kuwait's independence and settled the Kuwait-Iraq border issue, basing his decision on a correspondence between the two governments dated in 1932.

Hostilities resumed between Iraq and Kuwait in 1973 when Iraqi forces occupied the Kuwait border outpost at Al-Samtah. Iraq penetrated 3 kilometers into Kuwait territory under the pretext of wanting more port facilities beyond their port of Umm Qasr. After being pressured by the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq withdrew from Kuwait in 1977.

Al-Saqr devotes an entire chapter to Operation Desert Storm. Iraq selected 2 August 1990 as the invasion date for several reasons:

- August's intense summer heat and humidity made fighting conditions extremely arduous, and Iraq knew that Kuwait's decisionmakers and senior military officers would be leaving the country to escape the summer heat.
- 2 August was Ashoora, a religious holiday that gave Kuwait citizens half of a day off.
- H-hour of 2359 would produce maximum surprise, making it difficult for Kuwait forces to mobilize to repel an invasion.

Iraq's strategic deceptions included the following:

- Al-Saqr believed that the Arab Cooperation Council, created on 16 February 1989, was a strategic deception to hide Iraq's intention to invade Kuwait and designed to antagonize the GCC to give Baghdad another pretext to invade.
- Iraq's insistence on holding the Arab Summit in Baghdad on 17 July 1990 was designed as a diplomatic deception by Hussein. He laid invasion plans and moved forces even while the summit was underway.
- Iraqi propaganda touted a need for an Arab diplomatic solution in its dispute with Kuwait, giving Kuwait a false sense of security on the eve of the invasion.
- Conducting mass military exercises in southern Iraq was interpreted by many leaders as pressuring Kuwait to capitulate to Iraq's demands.
- According to Al-Saqr, Iraqi leaders lied to Arab leaders when they promised that Baghdad would not invade Kuwait.

Al-Saqr looks at the role of Kuwaiti military units that escaped Kuwait and fought with coalition forces to liberate their land. Among the achievements he lists are the provision of military parts, equipment, and materiel for coalition partners. Kuwaiti Skyhawks flew 1,326 sorties against Iraqi forces, and Mirage fighters conducted an additional 634 sorties. Kuwaiti military leaders coordinated intelligence gathering and sabotage operations with members of the Kuwait resistance inside occupied Kuwait. Six brigades (Al-Fateh, Shaheed, Al-Haq, Al-Tahreer, Al-Badr and Al-Khulud) joined Arab coalition forces in their push toward Kuwait City from the vicinity of Al-Khafji in Saudi Arabia.

The ground war lasted 100 hours and led to the defeat and ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. This was not the end of Iraqi hostilities, however. According to Al-Saqr, Iraq threatened Kuwait in October 1994 when it stationed 64,000 troops and 1,200 tanks along the Kuwait border. Aside from garnering the attention of coalition aircraft and positioned forces, Kuwait met this threat with three brigades and placed its air force on alert. The crisis was diffused by international military pressure.

Al-Saqr's book ends with a discussion of Kuwait's future national security, centering his thesis on interoperability, cooperation, and defense-sharing among GCC members. He envisions a Persian Gulf Defensive Council that would model itself after NATO, and classifies nations like Yemen, Iran, Iraq, and Israel as national security threats to the Persian Gulf states collectively.

Al-Saqr calls for military reforms within Kuwait and suggests that military training, modeled after U.S. ROTC programs, be made part of university studies. He advocates combining military studies with regular university coursework and attendance at a 9-month military finishing school after graduation.

Al-Saqr must have studied the reserve training methods of Western nations because he feels that Kuwait citizens should serve 1 day a month, and 1 month a year at the brigade level until the age of 35. He advocates creating youth brigades for young men ages 15 to 18 years of age. The envisioned youth brigades would guard major installations to free-up regular troops. Al-Saqr feels this would heighten Kuwait's military capability with its limited population resources.

[Editor's Note: On 1 April 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Al-Sabah presided over a ceremony designating Kuwait a major non-NATO Ally. Kuwait joins Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Bahrain, Egypt, Argentina, and Israel as designated major non-NATO allies of the United States.]

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MR Bookshelf

The 41st Infantry Division and the 4th Armored Division: Memoirs of World War II

Colonel Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army, Retired

Because its scope, scale, and horrors seem incomprehensible to us now, World War II continues to fascinate us. Books published on battles that occurred over 60 years ago seem somehow both remote and immediate. World War II is remote from contemporary experience and seems particularly distant, given the intervening Cold War era. Yet, the books remain immediate because we can still hear the voices and see the veterans of World War II, albeit in rapidly diminishing numbers. The lessons learned from World War II are valuable in understanding contemporary operations, and help us understand the human conditions of war.

Aging veterans are now adding their memoirs and personal accounts to the body of literature written in the first three decades after World War II. Biographers find that aging veterans are happy to discuss experiences that have reached "the fullness of time," and in retirement, veterans have time to discuss them.

Francis B. Catanzaro's *With the 41st Division in the Southwest Pacific, A Soldiers Story*, a personal memoir of a young infantryman, juxtaposed against Don M. Fox's *Patton's Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division*, provides an opportunity for us to relive the events that shaped their lives.[1] Both books show how conditions and fighting methods differed between the southwest Pacific and the European Theaters of Operation (ETO).

Poverty Row

Catanzaro fought with the 162d Infantry Regiment from 1944 through 1945, serving in the early months of the occupation of Japan. When the 162d broke up, its soldiers returned in small groups to the United States to be discharged. Catanzaro boarded the USS *Admiral H.T. Mayo* and departed for home on 29 December 1945. On New Year's Eve 1945, the 41st Infantry Division cased colors, and the soldiers still in Japan were reassigned without fanfare. More than 60 years later, Catanzaro describes the end of the 41st ID as "sad and inglorious." The end of the 41st was in some ways fitting because the battles it fought in New Guinea and the Philippines were "poverty row" compared to the experiences in Europe of the better-known 4th Armored Division (AD).

Although the 4th AD's story has been told many times, Fox makes it fresh by tapping into interviews with veterans who were junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers during the war. He extols the virtues of Major General John S. "P" Wood uncritically, while giving Major General Manton S. Eddy, Wood's Antagonist, short shrift.[2] This criticism aside, Fox's book has many of the same virtues as Catanzaro's memoir in that it tells the story from the viewpoint of tactical unit participants. Neither author gets at the "big blue arrow" vantage point, but they do not need to, because the general movements and combat operations of both units can be found elsewhere.

These compelling books illuminate combat at the eyeball level of

troops in the field. Cantanzaro's I Company fought its way through some of the toughest tactical engagements in the Pacific. Cantanzaro was in the thick of it, although he does not recall his bullets actually hitting any Japanese soldiers while in New Guinea or in the Philippines.

After nearly 4 months of fighting at Hollandia and Biak, only one-half of Cantanzaro's company remained. He and one other soldier were the only members of his 12-man squad remaining when their regiment moved into a rest area on New Guinea.

Jungle Rot

The "well" men were treated for jungle rot, with medics treating the soldiers' affected areas with a purple-colored concoction of potassium permanganate. To the sick, who were constantly under fire and poorly supplied, even small comforts proved memorable. Catanzaro remembers on 29 May 1944 burning the straps off his helmet while using it as a pan to fry "10 to 1" bacon that he scavenged from an abandoned supply dump for himself and his squad mates.

Catanzaro's communicates his memories in such a way that the reader experiences the bloody misery of being in the infantry. His little book makes it clear that admission into the unique club of combat soldiers in his rifle company was worth the price.

ETO Luxury

The 4th AD waged war in the comparative luxury of Europe, and it too was an exclusive club. *Patton's Vanguard* draws on soldiers' memories of the war. Fox tracks the 4th AD from its inception through its successful drive to retrieve the 101st Airborne at Bastogne. *Patton's Vanguard* ably illuminates the conditions of fighting in the ETO. Soldiering in the ETO differed from soldiering in the southwest Pacific by degree, not quality. Rain, cold, and German soldiers confronted the 4th AD. While Catanzaro rarely found himself the target of enemy air attacks, his colleagues in Europe often did. Fox reports that the 4th AD's antiaircraft artillery battalion shot down 134 enemy aircraft.

These books illustrate that while the sources of misery, illness, and fatalities varied, fighting in both theaters was fierce. Troops in the 41st ID and the 4th AD earned memberships in their exclusive clubs the hard way. These timeless tales of courage, compassion, and conviction are a testimony to the mens' strength in battle. The only real difference between the units is that the history of one is not well known while the other is celebrated. Both deserve accolades. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Francis B. Cantanzaro, *With the 41st Division in the Southwest Pacific, A Soldiers Story* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Don M. Fox, *Patton's Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2003).
2. The "P" in MG John S. Wood's name stands for "professor." For more information see on-line at <www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Gabel/gabel.asp>, accessed 22 April 2004.

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MR Book Reviews

THE TWENTY-FIVE YEAR CENTURY: A South Vietnamese General Remembers the Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon, Lam Quang Thi, University of North Texas Press, Denton, 2002, 423 pages, $32.95.

Despite the hundreds of books written about the Vietnam war, there was a large gap in the historiography of the war from the South Vietnamese perspective. In *The Twenty-five Year Century: A South Vietnamese General Remembers the Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon,* former South Vietnamese General Lam Quang Thi helps fill the gap. He examines the period from 1950 to 1975, describing the most important events of the 20th century for Thi and his generation.

Thi is a French-educated man from a wealthy, upper class, land-owning family along the Mekong Delta. He and his brother Lam Quang Tho enrolled in the newly established Vietnam National Army in 1950 and attended the first class of the Vietnam Military School of Inter-Arms at Dalat where they were eventually commissioned as second lieutenants.

From 1951 to 1954, Thi fought against the Viet Minh in North, Central, and South Vietnam. He describes the French occupation of Vietnam, the fall of the French, the reasons for the Viet Minh victory, and the arrival of the Americans. After 1955, Thi continued to serve in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, the South Vietnamese state founded by President Ngo Dinh Diem, and he received training in the United States at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during the late 1950s. Tall and dark skinned, the Viet Cong called Thi the "Black Panther of the South."

By 1966, Thi was a 33-year-old brigadier general, commanding the 9th (AVRN) Infantry Division. He had fought for more than 10 years against the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong. Thi was promoted to lieutenant general in 1972, assuming the post of I Corps deputy commander in charge of the corps forward command post at Hue. In late March 1975, he commanded the Northern Theater Task Force, defending Hue and Quang Tri. Thi's vivid, first-hand account describes the tragic events that led to the loss of Quang Tri, Hue, the fall of Da Nang, and the subsequent surrender of South Vietnam.

Thi's memoirs provide readers an appreciation for Vietnamese culture,

particularly the importance of Confucian ideals and traditions. He discusses Vietnamese family values, the respect the Vietnamese have for their elders, and the high premium they place on education. Birth order is also important. Although Thi outranked Tho, a two-star general, Tho made the final decisions in military situations, and Thi obeyed Tho in family matters.

Thi is candid in his opinions about his fellow South Vietnamese leaders and his U.S. counterparts. He is polite, but unflinchingly explicit, in describing the deficiencies he encountered among fellow Vietnamese senior officers. He is direct in describing the relationship between the South Vietnamese and U.S. advisers. He describes the difficulties in pursuing U.S. President Richard Nixon's "Vietnamization" program, which he describes as too little and too late.

Thi is also brutally frank in his assessment of South Vietnam's fall, but he does not fall into the "how we might have won" syndrome. He lays part of the blame on America's failure to provide promised support, but he also acknowledges South Vietnam's shortcomings, which contributed to the defeat.

Thi's memoir offers a unique perspective. The book is a valuable addition to the historiography of the Vietnam war.

LTC James H. Willbanks, ***USA, Retired, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

STRATEGIC ASIA 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks, Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, eds., The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, WA, 2002, 430 pages, $24.95.

Strategic Asia 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks is a masterfully written book. Using information from an annual series of investigations by the Strategic Asia Program of the National Bureau of Asian Research, the book examines what effects the 11 September 2001 attacks had on bilateral and multilateral relations in Asia.

Nicholas N. Eberstadt's essay on Korea predicted nearly every terror event of the past few years. He also forecasted a rather dreary future for U.S.-North Korea-South Korea relations, including the possibility of a military confrontation. Stephen P. Cohen's essay on South Asia is a short, intense analysis of a region often ignored by the United States, but one that is critical for international relations in the 21st century.

While concentrating on China, Japan, Russia, and North and South Korea, Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg discuss the United States' new bilateral relationships. They also address the growing concerns in South, Central, and Southeast Asia in a world of global terror and a newly awakened and militarily potent United States. Positing an Asia concerned for the future, worried about the spread of fundamentalist violent Islam, and analyzing the effect of economic malaise on the region, the authors leave few topics unassessed. The book is an excellent place to begin an investigation of U.S. policy alternatives in Asia.

LTC Peter J. Schifferle, ***USA, Retired, Ph.D., Lansing, Kansas***

WAGING WAR WITHOUT WARRIORS: The Changing Culture of Military Conflict, Christopher Coker, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2002, 195 pages, $49.95.

In *Waging War without Warriors*, Christopher Coker examines the transformation of war as an all-consuming contest that tries not only the individual's will to survive but also the will of the entire community. Past wars were seen as existential and self-affirming to the individual and instrumental to the state; war was personal and practical. Coker states that in the West today war is a foreign policy tool that lacks the human intimacy and value of past wars. The balance between war's instrumental and existential aspects has now swung completely to the instrumental side. The focus on instrumentality enables existential warriors to defeat stronger instrumental Western armies such as those of Vietnam and Afghanistan.

By focusing on ancient Greece, Coker provides a history of martial cultures, analyzing how those cultures are changing. He traces the development of the warrior spirit, moving from Rome's systemization of violence to alternative ways of war, such as avocated by Sun Tzu, the Islamic tradition, and Japan's kamikazes. War is no longer considered mankind's most revealing behavior; it has become a competition between rival technologies that are disconnected, impersonal, and increasingly unacceptable to the West.

Coker argues that the lack of personal human drama in war reduces the West's willingness to sacrifice itself in great struggles. This technological effect is corrosive because war is becoming similar to a video game, where no one has an emotional stake in the outcome and no one takes responsibility for individual actions. Coker feels that tomorrow's combatants will be technicians divorced emotionally from the battlefield, and he explores the significance of an evolving culture of war that is devoid of a heroic warrior.

A resounding warning for the West is that it must continue to dominate war, preserve its culture, and find a way to reinvest individual involvement and commitment in the act of making war. We must rediscover the value of "fighting for something." According to Coker, if we do not rediscover the existential value of war, we will be in danger of repeating the actions that brought the Roman Empire's collapse when Rome became unwilling to defend itself against the barbarians. Technology must augment the warrior, not supplant him.

LTC John R. Sutherland, ***USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

IRAN AND THE SURROUNDING WORLD: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics, Nikki R. Keddie and Rudi Matthee, eds., University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2002, 400 pages, $30.00.

Iran considers itself to be a cultural beacon in the Middle East and South Asia. The Islamic fervor of the 1979 Iranian revolution is only one manifestation of centuries of poetic, artistic, linguistic, and cultural influences that Iran (Persia) has had in the region. In private circles, the Iranians feel they brought the theory of governance, bureaucracy, and an appreciation for art to their Arab conquerors in the 8th century. They also feel that it is in their tradition that Islam is being reinterpreted to address the

issues of the 21st century. Those studying the Middle East should not ignore the psychological superiority the Iranians feel toward their neighbors.

Sixteen cultural and political academics who specialize in subjects relating to Iran, focus on Iran's image of itself, its culture, and its history. Essayist Juan Cole presents a historical assessment of the Iranian culture and how it has permeated South Asia. He explains that during the rise of the Mughal Empire in India, many Persians flocked to the subcontinent, bringing with them bureaucratic experience. Over the decades, the Persian language became the language of the Mughal court, which required that those pursuing a higher education in India must first learn Persian.

Thomas Barfield examines Turkish, Arab, and Persian tribal relationships and how they affect Iran as a modern state. He describes the Safavid, Qajar, and Pehlavi dynasties and how they sought to balance the three ethnic tribes within Iran to try to forge a nationalist identity.

Golnar Mehran analyzes Islamic Republic school textbooks to understand what civic lessons are being taught. First and second grade social study books focus on an introduction of Iran, its people, and its customs. For example, Iranians are bound by a common land and share common feasts such as Aid-e-Nawruz (Persian Zoroastrian New Year). Islam is not mentioned at this level.

By the third and fourth grades, primary school texts begin to emphasize Islam, equating patriotism with martyrdom. Only 1 of 26 primary school textbooks mentions non-Muslims, Zoroastrians, and no book mentions the linguistic differences within the country. Role models for young Iranians are always male and include members of the Ulama (clergy), who combine political ideology with religious status. The world as presented to young Iranians is black and white, good and evil.

Wilfried Buchta highlights the writings of Abdul-Karim Soroush, a controversial religious thinker. Soroush has abandoned a need to convert Sunni Muslims into Shiites and focuses on a reconciliation of the Islamic Umma (community). He postulates that all Muslims share the same belief of tawhid (God's unity), nubuwa (prophethood) and ma'ad (belief in judgment day).

Asef Bayat and Bahman Baktiari describe the effect Iran's revolution had on Egypt. They postulate that Iran's influence was at its height when Teheran embarked on social mobilization, democratic practice, and popular participation. In contrast, they describe Iran's political influence to have been at its lowest when it was authoritarian and advancing militant or repressive policies.

Middle East affairs officers, foreign area officers, intelligence specialists, and psychological operations specialists should read this book. It is excellent.

LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,
USN, Gaithersburg, Maryland

HOW WARS ARE WON: The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terrorism, Bevin Alexander, Crown Publishers, New York, 2002, 416 pages, $25.95.

In *How Wars are Won: The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror,* Bevin Alexander lists 13 rules of war that have influenced warfighting throughout history. Alexander's rules have a distinct Sun Tzu flavor (spiced with some Napoleonic principles) and include such enticing topics as "Uproar East," "Attack West," "Stroke at a Weak Spot," and "Maneuvers on the Rear." Alexander devotes a chapter to each rule and gives historical examples of how the rule can be successfully practiced. In most cases, the battles and campaigns he chooses clearly support his argument.

Alexander takes his rules one step further as he concludes each chapter with the rule's future implications. The majority of his analyses describes each rule's effect on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). He also discusses how the rules could be used in the war with Iraq.

Although Alexander's discussion on the GWOT and Iraq is certainly timely, the tie-in with some of the rules is a bit of a stretch. I had difficulty following Alexander's arguments that "Caldron Battles" and "Feigned Retreat" would have significance in relation to the GWOT. Future implications for certain rules seem to have been late additions.

Alexander keeps his readers focused, but occasionally he throws in a controversial opinion. He answers some questions, but raises more questions than he answers.

LTC Rick Baillergeon, *USA,*
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

MEDIEVAL CHINESE WARFARE, 300-900, David A. Graff, Routledge, New York, 2002, 288 pages, $27.95.

David Graff's *Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300-900,* contains little on battles, more on the military, and most on the "interrelationship of warfare, state, and society during the six centuries between the fall of the Western Jin Dynasty and the fall of the Tang Dynasty." To show how war shaped China, Graff exploits classical Chinese sources and the best Sinological scholars to connect military affairs with political and social developments. Instead of lamenting the shortcomings of his sources, such as a lack of attention to battles, he exploits Chinese historians' preoccupation with the way states make war.

Concentrating on the strengths of the sources he uses, Graff presents a synthetic picture of Chinese military history during the medieval period. Because Western readers know little about this period, Graff introduces the subject with a brief sketch of Chinese military thought and action before 300. By explaining the way Japanese and Western scholars periodize Chinese history using tripartite classical, medieval, and modern frameworks, he places his history in a framework that makes it more accessible to Western readers.

Throughout the medieval period, North China was regularly invaded and occupied by Turk and Uighurs from Central Asia. These recurrent invasions were China's primary international relations problem until the mid-18th century, when the Qing Dynasty finally ended it by pacifying Tibet and Central Asia. Although these invaders regularly established ruling dynasties in North China and

the Tang-conquered large territories, the only foreign war a Chinese dynasty fought during this period took place in Korea and ended in failure. After 626, the Tang Dynasty was more successful against Central Asian opponents (creating the largest empire in Chinese history) because their opponents were divided.

When fighting the Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia, Chinese dynasties needed to use cavalry properly. Procuring and training horses was a continual problem for Chinese dynasties because they could not divide and conquer the Central Asian horsemen. Thus, imperial stud farms and the quality of the livestock in the remount system were important parts of Chinese success or failure. When the Chinese imperial state was racked by civil war, it became easier for barbarians from outside China to come and stay. Graff's account ends with the Tang Dynasty's collapse into a welter of provincial militarists. The unitary imperial state was reconstituted after a 53-year hiatus, and a new period of Chinese history began.

The book has several shortcomings. For instance, a character list and a table of the dynasties might have been included as appendixes. These minor quibbles aside, I congratulate Graff for presenting readers with this valuable work. Because the present can only come from the past and geography presents societies and states with recurrent problems and dilemmas, this book is useful reading for anyone interested in contemporary geopolitics.

Lewis Bernstein, Sr., *Ph.D.*,
Huntsville, Alabama

COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM MALAYA AND VIETNAM: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, John A. Nagl, Praeger, Westport, CT, 2002, 249 pages, $67.95.

The British Army developed a successful counterinsurgency doctrine in Malaya because of its success as a learning institution, whereas in Vietnam, the U.S. Army was not a learning institution and was opposed to learning how to fight and win a counterinsurgency.

John A. Nagl is too young to have served in Vietnam, but I served as a district senior adviser in South Vietnam from 1968 to 1969. Still, Nagl has a reputation of being a determined thinker and icon breaker. His book attempts to shake up the Army by getting it to seriously consider the neglected field of counterinsurgency. For this, Nagl deserves kudos. I have several concerns about the book, however.

The topic is too broad for such a short book. Nagl's treatment of the Malayan emergency and the Vietnam conflict is terse and general, and because it is so condensed, some vital issues get little consideration. Some information is inaccurate.

Conflicts in Malaya and Vietnam differed from each other. The war in Malaya was fought within a geographically distinct area where external support could be limited or eliminated. The Vietnam war was fought within an area that could not be cut off from necessary and ample external support. Internal and external political situations in the wars varied widely.

Logistics denial was key to counterinsurgency in both countries. The Malayan insurgency was self-contained and eventually vulnerable as the guerrillas were cut off from food. The Vietnamese insurgency received major external aid via the Ho Chi Minh Trail and small boat coastal resupply throughout the war.

Malaya remained a counterinsurgency throughout the conflict. In South Vietnam, the insurgency effectively committed suicide during the 1968 Tet Offensive and never recovered. The communist force that eventually conquered South Vietnam was a conventional force, not a guerrilla force.

In Malaya, the British used small forces for village and hamlet security while avoiding large operations, indiscriminate use of artillery, and fruitless jungle bashing. In Vietnam, the U.S. Army approach was more diffuse. The bulk of U.S. forces was involved in conventional operations. However, advisers, special forces, and civil affairs personnel were involved in a program similar to that of the British.

While Nagl acknowledges the belated appearance of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program, he does not look at key components, such as the Hamlet Evaluation System, the Territorial Forces Evaluation System, and Armed Propaganda Teams. It is not that a major component of the Army did not learn and adapt to counterinsurgency; a more accurate characterization is that the Army was fighting a conventional jungle war and a counterinsurgency simultaneously. Army leaders were more comfortable with the conventional fight than they were with the counterinsurgency effort. This tendency continues today with the food fights between the conventional and special operations forces (SOF) community.

Nagl talks about only the first 12 years of the Malayan counterinsurgency (1948 to 1960). He ignores the subsequent 21-year counterinsurgency effort (1968 to 1989) when the fight passed from British to Malaysian control.

I am not convinced that the learning and adapting model is a useful tool for studying these counterinsurgencies. I feel that it actually obscures the real issues through generalization, selective consideration, and simplification.

These considerations aside, this is an important book because it raises the need to reconsider the Army's readiness to conduct counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency should not be the exclusive realm of the SOF community because many of the tools for counterinsurgency belong to the conventional force. Insurgency is likely in the current operating environment. The force needs to prepare to meet it; the debate on how best to do it should begin now.

LTC Lester W. Grau, *USA, Retired,*
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LEE'S TAR HEELS: The Pettigrew-Kirkland-MacRae Brigade, Earl J. Hess, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2002, 437 pages, $39.95.

In presenting the most comprehensive account of one of the Confederacy's most celebrated and successful units, Earl J. Hess draws on published sources and unpublished diaries and letters to weave an intricate and captivating tale of life and the toils of war in the

Pettigrew-Kirkland-MacRae Brigade. Hess traces the roots of the brigade, under the command of Brigadier General James Johnston Pettigrew, from the cornerstone of the 26th North Carolina to the organization of the brigade in 1862.

While many of the details of the brigade's wartime activities are readily found in secondary sources, we can draw an accurate portrait of day-to-day life only from first-person accounts. Astonishingly, some 100 such accounts exist in the form of personal letters, diaries, memoirs, and service records—an unusually large number, especially for a Confederate unit. Hess weaves his sources into a seamless storyline, following the brigade from Gettysburg to Appomattox.

An Associate Professor of History at Lincoln Memorial University and the author of *Pickett's Charge—The Last Attack at Gettysburg* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001), Hess recounts the brigade's rich battle history, tracing the combat record from battles at Falling Waters, Briscoe Station, the Wilderness Campaign, Cold Harbor, the Petersburg Campaign, and numerous others. *Lee's Tar Heels: The Pettigrew-Kirkland-MacRae Brigade* is a definitive, engaging account of wartime commanders and the men of one of the Army of Northern Virginia's finest fighting brigades. Pettigrew, with Brigadier Generals William Kirkland and William MacRae, established the brigade's reputation among the South's fiercest and most capable units.

Hess's writing is crisp, clear, and captivating, and the book is a worthwhile addition to any Civil War library.

MAJ Steven Leonard, *USA,*
Fort Campbell, Kentucky

HITLER'S VOLKSSTURM: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944-1945, David K. Yelton, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 2002, 305 pages, $39.95.

Just as Saddam Hussein hoped his Fedayeen would somehow stall the U.S. drive on Baghdad in the spring of 2003, Adolf Hitler hoped an irregular force, the Volkssturm, would rescue Germany from defeat during the last months of World War II.

Unlike the Iraqi Fedayeen who were drawn from Ba'ath party diehards, the Volkssturm was to be a National Socialist levee en masse drawn from the entire able-bodied male population of Germany. According to Hitler's vision, the Volkssturm's numbers and patriotic zeal would make the conquest of Germany so costly that the Jew-dominated home fronts of Germany's enemies would collapse and the Reich would be saved. In reality, the Volkssturm was a military failure that did little to alter the course of the war's final campaigns.

David K. Yelton gives us clear reasons for the Volkssturm's failure: it was poorly equipped, poorly trained, and suffered from inevitable morale problems of a hodge-podge force asked to rescue a lost cause. As a result, its combat record was distinctly mixed. In a few places like Germany's eastern frontier, Volkssturm battalions, motivated to protect their homes from the Red Army's avenging fury, gave a reasonably good account of themselves. On the western front, the Volkssturm was usually less than a speed bump to Allied spearheads. In the final accounting, the Volkssturm did little to influence the course of the final campaigns.

Yelton is less concerned with the Volkssturm's fighting record than he is in why it was created and why it failed. In investigating these questions, he discovers that the institutional history of the Volkssturm offers a unique window into the bizarre politics of the Third Reich's last days.

Before autumn 1944, Hitler had been reluctant to create a popular militia. Recalling the collapse of the German home front in 1918, he feared that placing such heavy demands on the German populace would lead to a similar collapse in morale. Events and the influence of one man changed his mind.

The events included the arrival of Allied armies on the Reich's border and the spontaneous creation of local defense forces by Nazi gauleiters. Martin Bormann was the man who urged Hitler to let the party take control of a popular militia force to stiffen Germany's defenses while completing the "Nazification" of the German people. Bormann got his way and, using skillful ideological arguments and special access to Hitler, blocked attempts by Heinrich Himmler, Albert Speer, Joseph Goebbels, and the German Army to wrest control of the Volkssturm from the Nazi Party. In doing so, Bormann showed himself the master of a Darwinian competition for power that characterized the fragmented political process in Nazi Germany.

For all his skill in bureaucratic infighting, Bormann lacked the resources and expertise to turn the Volkssturm into an effective fighting force. As the Third Reich collapsed, the Volkssturm failed to achieve any of the political or military objectives that Hitler and Bormann had laid out. Instead of legions of well-armed, patriotic Aryan warriors, middle-aged men carrying castoff weapons manned the Volkssturm battalions. Yelton argues that disparity between vision and execution offers clear evidence that, by late 1944, ideology had totally overwhelmed reality in Nazi decisionmaking.

Yelton's argument is based on impressive research and persuasive analysis. His book offers a fascinating, readable, highly recommended case study of the political culture of a dying regime.

LTC Scott Stephenson, *USA*
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

JOHNNY GREEN OF THE ORPHAN BRIGADE: The Journal of a Confederate Soldier, Albert. D. Kirwan, ed., University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2002, 272 pages, $22.00.

University Press of Kentucky has reissued *Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade: The Journal of a Confederate Soldier,* which is a personal memoir of a Kentucky Confederate soldier. Green, who enlisted early, joined the 9th Kentucky Infantry, served throughout the war in the West, and became a sergeant major. After the war, Green rewrote his wartime journal for his family but never intended to publish the book. His narrative exhibits tell-tale signs of post-war reworking such as mixing the present and past tenses.

A common soldier from a state that never seceded, Green was a volunteer. His experiences were not unusual, but the value of his reminiscences comes precisely from their commonness. To a certain extent, Green was a Confederate "everyman." He describes his motivation for fighting as defending the cause of a constitutional government, denouncing Northern coercion as sinful. Whether these characterizations are Green's or postwar editing is not clear. Overall, the book is poignant, revealing, and sometimes, humorous.

LTC D. Jonathan White, ***USA,***
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WHAT DOES THE WORLD WANT FROM AMERICA? International Perspectives on U.S. Foreign Policy, Alexander T.J. Lennon, ed., The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, 200 pages, $22.95.

This interesting collection of essays looks at U.S. international relations and foreign policy and asks us to think about what other nations want, need, hope for, and expect from the United States. The book begins with perspectives from around the world answering the question, "What role would you want the United States to play in your region or country?" Twelve essays from large and small nations in Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa show the wide range of answers.

The book examines recurring key issues of U.S. policy. When should the United States act alone? When must the United States get the support or approval of other nations or organizations? Do terrorists strike the United States because of America's military or economic power or because of the overall diffusion of Western culture throughout the world?

The tough issues the book addresses continue to challenge national leaders. Readers might conclude that the United States needs something it does not yet have. Perhaps it is time for America to form a detailed bipartisan foreign policy that can cope with the Global War on Terrorism and other challenges while remaining consistent, regardless of who the president is or what party controls Congress. Readers interested in foreign policy will find this book's perspectives refreshing.

MAJ Herman Reinhold, ***USAF,***
Yokota Air Base, Japan

THE FRENCH SECOND EMPIRE: An Anatomy of Political Power, Roger Price, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001, 507 pages, $75.00.

The French mucked up every step of the way while losing the Franco-Prussian War. Roger Price provides a compelling historical analysis of the French Second Empire that is a useful tool to military and government planners today. While the book is a political portrait of Napoleon III, the calamities Price describes are similar to the economic, political, and military balance that America is struggling to achieve today in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Department of Defense officials might find that the chapters titled "The Rise of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte" and "State and Society" provide valuable insight for nation-building; military planners will certainly note the similarities in "The Rise of Opposition" and "War and Revolution" that are relevant to current operations. Price uses an impressive list of documents, unpublished papers, and published sources from the French National Achieves for his analysis, which is well worth reading.

COL Arley H. McCormick, ***USA,***
Retired, Huntsville, Alabama

THE SPECTER OF GENOCIDE: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective, Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, eds., Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003, 396 pages, $60.00.

Genocide? Does the word define crimes of war, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing? The essays in *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective* make it clear that these terms are not synonymous. Although the UN defined the term "genocide" in 1948, there is no scholarly consensus on how the other terms are defined.

Genocide is a relatively new field of study that crosses traditional academic disciplines such as history, political science, and sociology in an effort to understand what genocide is and why it happens. This collection of 16 essays includes new material as well as expanded versions of papers presented at the 2000 conference in Barcelona. The editors tie the essays together with introductory and concluding essays.

The essays on "Genocide and Modernity" ask what in modernity produces genocide. Four essays produce four substantial and different answers. These essays should alert the reader not to expect pat answers from the essayists.

Genocide during both World Wars occurred in Armenia, Russia (Stalin's terror), Germany, and Japan. Japanese brutalities in China were not considered genocide but, rather, as crimes of war or crimes against humanity. Since World War II, genocide has occurred in Bali, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Guatemala. The essay on Guatemala explains the difficulties in distinguishing between genocide and political repression, as in where the ethnic minority (the Mayans) is also a political threat.

This book is a starting point for those who wish to learn more about the complexities of the genocide debate. While this collection of essays does not provide all of the answers, it makes it apparent just how few answers there really are.

John H. Barnhill, ***Ph.D.,***
Yukon, Oklahoma

THE MALADY OF ISLAM, Abdelwahab Meddeb, Pierre Joris and Ann Reid, eds., Basic Books, New York, 2003, 241 pages, $24.00.

The Malady of Islam, which offers insight into the condition of modern Islam, is written more for someone familiar with Islam than for the neophyte. The book's strength is also its weakness: it is written by a Muslim scholar deeply involved in the debate about Islam's direction in the modern world. So, it is the product of one conversant in Islamic history and thought but it is also the work of a Muslim whose thought fits better in Paris (where he lives and teaches) than in the cities and villages of the Middle East.

The book's choppiness and loosely organized arguments suggest that Abdelwahap Meddeb wrote the book in urgency following the 11 September 2001 attacks. The U.S.

edition, which was written in March and April 2003, clearly states Meddeb's conclusion and offers a proposal to implement it. He says that instead of the United States being the answer to the sickness of Islam and the ills of the Middle East, it is instead part of the problem, most evident in the United States' current involvement in Iraq. European nations should assert themselves as political, military, and moral counterbalances to the United States and rectify what ails the Middle East.

What is important here is not the quality of Meddeb's argument, but the depth of his cynicism about America's intentions, evenhandedness, and sense of justice. He charges that the U.S.-Middle East policy is controlled by pro-Israeli neoconservatives and that the invasion of Iraq was not about freedom or weapons of mass destruction, but about regional hegemony and Israeli security. He accuses President George W. Bush of having a fascination with extreme religion, which precludes criticism of Wahhabism even after the 11 September attacks. When liberal, educated Muslims think this way, then America has a serious problem.

The majority of the book traces the roots of Islamic fundamentalism as put forward by the Hanbalite scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 A.D.). Meddeb describes fundamentalism as defective and unrepresentative of the history of Islam and seeks to return to a mythical original Islam, which in reality, never existed.

Islam in its modern form, represented by al-Qaeda and similar groups, is a symptom, not a cause, of what Meddeb describes as the sickness of Islam. In such times of sickness, the violent, literal reading of the *Qur'an* that exalts Jihad is chosen by some over the gentle, tolerant interpretation Meddeb considers more representative of Islam. He says nothing in Islam predisposes it to terrorism.

Meddeb sees modern fundamentalism as a response to what is seen as the marginalization of religion and the replacement of the divine by human authority resulting from the spread of Western secularism. It is this enlightenment model with which Meddeb identifies.

Meddeb is correct that something happened to the Islamic society more than half a millennium ago; it dropped from the forefront of science, culture, and trade, and its decline led to the European colonization of much of the Muslim world in the 19th century. Many Muslims look past this period to Islam's early days of glory and resent their experience of military, economic, and political inferiority. Their sense of victimization only plays into the hands of extremists.

Meddeb argues that Islamic fundamentalism must be understood as much in terms of the "Americanization" of the world as in terms of Islamic sectarianism. Americanization seems to mean an appreciation of technology apart from any system of values and the acceptance of a wide range of private religious beliefs within an overarching secular culture.

Authors John Esposito and Bernard Lewis offer better introductions to Islam and clearer explanations of how Islam and Islamic nations have gotten into the condition they are in, but for those with a deeper interest in Islam, Meddeb provides a liberal Muslim perspective on the state of Islam and the role of the United States in world affairs. While his views on Islam differ significantly from those of traditional Muslims living in the Middle East, his opinion of the United States does not. This should be cause for concern for U.S. policymakers and those representing the United States in Muslim countries.

CH (COL) Douglas McCready,
ARNG, Dexheim, Germany

BURMA'S ARMED FORCES: Power Without Glory, Andrew Selth, Eastbridge, Norwalk, CT, 2002, 371 pages, $44.95.

Andrew Selth is a former diplomatic officer who served in Burma, Korea, and New Zealand. Since 1986, he has served as a strategic analyst with the Australian Defense Intelligence Organization.

Although Burma (Myanmar) is not important in overall world affairs, it has powerful regional influence and plays a leading role as the most volatile and largest, if not the strongest, country in mainland Southeast Asia. In past years, Burma was isolated and ignorant of the wider world—a view with which Westerners, whose acquaintance with Burma was partly based on the song, "On the Road to Mandalay," concurred.

Strategically located, Burma borders India, China, Thailand, Laos, and Bangladesh. The country, which is primarily rural with few roads, has been declared by the UN as one of the world's poorest nations. Although Burma is xenophobic and isolation-minded, it is wooed by India and China and feared by Japan and Korea, as it becomes increasingly more important in Southeast Asian affairs.

Since the end of World War II and its emergence as an independent nation in 1948, Burma and its armed forces have played a critical role in its governance. The military sees itself as the most important segment of Burma's political society. While confronting counterinsurgency struggles against several tribes and more than 40 ethnic groups, the military is still able to defend its nation's territorial and maritime claims. With the exception of a failed coup in 1962, the military's rule has never been seriously challenged. Burma's generals have strengthened the kingdom so as to defend against any challenge, and the military keeps a paranoidal grip on the nation. Military leaders take whatever measures are necessary to remain the arbiter of internal power and are willing to punish or silence any dissenters.

Selth describes Burma's internal structure and the organization of its military force, detailing how it recruits, indoctrinates, and trains volunteers and draftees. He describes Burma's history, development, and military growth since its independence and presents Burma's current order of battle. According to Selth, Burma has a fascination with exotic weapons—chemical and biological—although he says Burma has no interest in developing an atomic arsenal.

Well-written, informative, and insightful, this book is worthwhile to those concerned with Southeast Asia. However, unless one is a spe-

cialist in Southeast Asia, $44.95 is a high price to pay for the book.

COL Cecil B. Currey, *USAR, Retired, Lutz, Florida*

THE UNITED STATES MARINES IN NORTH CHINA, 1894-1942, Chester M. Biggs, Jr., McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, NC, 2003, 284 pages, $42.50.

Chester M. Biggs, who has written a first-class account of *The United States Marines in North China, 1894-1942,* served as a China Marine and survived nearly 4 years of Japanese captivity. He presents a thorough, sensitive, insightful story, focusing on the "legation" era, the Boxer Rebellion, garrison life, and the eventual surrender of the legation Marines following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The China Marines and their Army colleagues operated in small detachments to secure U.S. interests in a China that had been weakened by warlords and that was locked in perpetual civil war. Although the Marines demonstrated remarkable evenhandedness, the nature of the mission—protecting trade legations forced on the Chinese—assured that most Chinese regarded them as occupiers. Biggs distinguishes the operations in North China, designed to protect the legations from landings, incidents, and incursions, from operations elsewhere in China.

Biggs's narrative of the Boxer Rebellion is well done and illustrates the combined nature of the legation powers' reaction to the "fist of righteous harmony" movement. Biggs's narrative, spiced with first-person accounts, reveals the complexity and danger the small combined force confronted while on the march to relieve the besieged legation garrisons. In Peking (Beijing), a handful of troops and worried civilians weathered the siege with a sense of camaraderie and courage that Biggs ably illustrates. Biggs's more important contribution is his sensitivity to the story of garrison life among the legation marines.

The book is filled with characters. There is Adna Chaffee, the old Army Indian fighter who led an Army and Marine contingent on the march to relieve the garrison, and the legendary Marine, Smedley Butler, a young officer who won a brevet on the march and later returned to China as a brigadier general in command of the 3d Marine Brigade.

The China hands served their country well, winning 33 Medals of Honor for their courage and ability to work with the Chinese during the Boxer rebellion. Despite the imperial nature of the mission, the Marines, under Butler's command, earned the respect and cooperation of the Chinese. This respect was demonstrated when a North China town voted the Marines an "Umbrella of Ten Thousand Blessings" for promoting good will and good order in the region. Biggs's book is an enjoyable, useful telescope into a past not inconsistent with missions U.S. Armed Forces face today.

COL Gregory Fontenot, *USA, Retired, Lansing, Kansas*

TO BATTLE FOR GOD AND THE RIGHT: The Civil War Letterbooks of Emerson Opdycke, Glenn V. Longacre and John E. Haas, eds., University of Illinois Press, Champaign, 2003, 332 pages, $34.95.

To Battle for God and the Right: The Civil War Letterbooks of Emerson Opdycke is a collection of personal letters written by Emerson Opdycke to his wife, Lucy, from 1861 to 1865. Opdycke speaks of the hardships, evils, and triumphs he and his soldiers confront during the Civil War.

Opdycke's career began with the 41st Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment where he became a lieutenant. He performed with valor in battles in the Western Theater at Pittsburgh Landing (Shiloh), after which he was promoted to colonel. The Governor of Ohio selected Opdycke to form a new regiment, designated the 125th Ohio Volunteer Infantry (OVI) Regiment. The regiment engaged in fierce fighting at Chickamauga, Chattanooga-Missionary Ridge, the Atlanta Campaign, the Battle of Franklin at Carter House, and Nashville.

Under Opdycke's leadership and strict discipline, the 125th OVI fought valiantly at Chickamauga and stood with Union Major General George H. Thomas on Snodgrass Hill. At Missionary Ridge, Opdycke and the 125th OVI were among the first regiments to crest the ridge and pursue fleeing Confederate forces. At the Battle of Franklin, the 1st Brigade, under Opdycke's leadership, saved the Army of the Cumberland, a fear that earned Opdycke praise and special recommendation for promotion to brigadier general from Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, Major General George H. Thomas, General Jacob D. Cox, and General James A. Garfield.

In his letters, Opdycke expresses opinions about his commanders, the men with whom he served, and the battles he fought, giving minute details that cannot be found in common history books or regimental histories. Although he abhorred command incompetence, Opdycke was quick to praise those who performed superbly. He required respect, loyalty, and discipline from his officers and soldiers and rid himself of those who could not or would not perform to his expectations.

Opdycke cared deeply for his soldiers and sought to give them what they needed to fight and win. His letters offer insight into his relationships with his men and also his views on slavery, which he saw as evil and corrupt.

Lucy began transcribing her husband's letters, which have never been located, into letterbooks in 1864, an undertaking that took 10 years to complete. Editors Glen V. Longacre and John E. Haas conducted extensive research to authenticate the historical contents the letterbooks depicted. Although Haas is an archivist with the Ohio Historical Society where some of the Opdycke artifacts and records are stored, he and Longacre did not rely solely on this information. They interviewed Opdycke's descendents, dug through mounds of paperwork at the National Archives, researched several sources of information at many universities, and consulted newspapers, diaries, books, and official Civil War records.

Other sources of information include two books soldiers of the 125th OVI wrote: Ralsa Rice's *Yankee Tigers: Through the Civil War with the 125th Ohio* (Blue Acorn Press, Huntington, WV, 1992 [reprint]) and Charles T. Clark's *Opdycke Tigers* (publisher information not available) written in the late 19th century. These books complement Opdycke's letterbooks.

Opdycke dated his letters, which makes this book an exceptional reference for research on the Army of the Cumberland and Civil War battles fought in the Western Theater. Also included is a foreword by Peter Cozzens, the author of several historical books on the Western Theater. The magnitude of Longacre and Haas's intense research leaves little doubt as to the accuracy of the historical information in this book. I recommend it highly.

Paul L. Hulse, ***Columbus, Georgia***

THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA: Challenges, Politics and Power, Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2002, 157 pages, $20.00.

American security interests in Indonesia include developing a cooperative partner in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism and maintaining a stable government capable of preventing internal unrest from threatening adjacent maritime chokepoints that link the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Previously, Indonesian armed forces (TNI) helped perpetuate stability under the autocratic government of Suharto; however, post-Suharto democratic reforms seek to phase out the TNI's formal political role.

Drawing on personal experience in the region and a series of interviews with senior TNI leaders, RAND analyst Angel Rabasa and former U.S. Defense Attaché Colonel John Haseman provide a concise primer on the TNI and what the United States might expect in the near future. Their briefing-style report, current through mid-2002, begins with a brief overview of TNI's history and addresses the emergence of democratic government and how it is reshaping "the most important and powerful institution in Indonesian society."

Although Rabassa and Haseman note a fundamental doctrinal shift from internal security to external defense, they do not discuss Indonesia's external threats beyond international terrorist groups. The authors identify as internal threats secessionist movements at the far ends of the island state, ethnic or religious tensions, and radical Islam. The report concludes with a review of U.S. policy toward the TNI, a discussion of alternative scenarios in Indonesia, and a list of policy recommendations.

Rabasa and Haseman are critical of the cancellation of International Military Education and Training programs with Indonesia. They believe that eliminating the program has hindered TNI's professionalization and denied the United States personal contacts. However, they offer no clear answer to the question of how to withdraw the TNI from its internal security role in furtherance of democratic reform while preventing local strengthening of radical elements. Despite this, the study is an excellent factual introduction to current security issues in Indonesia.

Clifton W. Sherrill, ***Florida State University, Tallahassee***